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We investigate capital allocation across a firm's divisions that differ with respect to the 
degree of asset tangibility. We adopt an incomplete contracting approach where the out-
come of potential debt renegotiations depends on the liquidation value of assets. How-
ever, with diversity in terms of asset tangibility, liquidation proceeds depend on how 
funds have been allocated across divisions. As diversity can be traced back to institu-
tional differences between countries, we provide a rationale for multidivisional deci-
sion-making in an international context. A main finding is that multinationals may be 
bound to go to certain countries when financiers cannot control the capital allocation. 
Keywords: Internal capital markets, multinational corporations, incomplete contracts, 
asset tangibility. 
JEL Classification: G31, F23, D82 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Gegenstand dieser Untersuchung ist die Kapitalallokation bei multidivisionalen Unter-
nehmen, deren Divisionen sich durch eine unterschiedliche Verwertbarkeit der mit ih-
nen verbundenen Vermögensgegenständen auszeichnen. Ausgangspunkt ist ein Modell 
unvollständiger Verträge, wobei das Ergebnis von Kreditnachverhandlungen vom Li-
quidationswert des Unternehmens abhängen. Aufgrund der Diversität bezüglich der 
Verwertbarkeit sind die Liquidationserlöse davon abhängig, wie das Kapital auf die Di-
visionen verteilt sind. Da Diversität auf institutionelle Unterschiede zwischen Ländern 
zurückführbar ist, werden somit Entscheidungen in multidivisionalen Unternehmen in 
einem internationalen Kontext dargestellt. Ein Ergebnis ist, dass multinationale Unter-
nehmen nicht frei in ihrer Auswahl von Gastländern sind, wenn Gläubiger die Kapital-
allokation nicht steuern können. 
Schlagworte: Interne Kapitalmärkte, multinationale Unternehmen, unvollständige Ver-
träge, asset tangibility. 
                                                 
1  This paper was partly written while the author was visiting the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. Financial support from Fritz Thyssen Stiftung is gratefully acknowledged.  
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1 Introduction 
Asset tangibility has been found to be an important determinant of a company's ability 
to finance investments externally (Almeida and Campello, 2006). The basic reasoning is 
that the tangibility of assets determines the external financiers' valuation of a firm's 
transferable assets in case of default. As financiers rely to some extent on the liquida-
tion of a company's assets in order to cope with opportunistic behavior or asymmetric 
information issues, the degree of the overall asset tangibility finally establishes an upper 
bound on a firm's total debt capacity. 
But what happens when a firm has several lines of business that differ with respect to the 
degree of asset tangibility? How does diversity in terms of asset tangibility affect the 
firm's investment behavior? In this paper we take up this problem, which can be given a 
concrete motivation. During the last decades the world economy has integrated at a rapid 
pace. This process has taken place to a significant degree on the firm level, which refers to 
the economic activities of multinational corporations (henceforth MNCs). Diversity in 
terms of asset tangibility has then almost naturally become an issue since MNCs virtually 
always operate in countries that differ with respect to jurisdiction, regulations and other 
country-specific institutional factors that affect asset tangibility.2 For example, when as-
sets are to be liquidated in a certain country, lacking property rights and unpredictable le-
gal decisions may require additional costly safeguarding measures to enforce the claims 
specified in an asset sale contract. Other problems may arise when labor market regula-
tions form an obstacle for a potential buyer to redeploy assets properly by adjusting em-
ployment. Furthermore, in a country with an inadequately developed financial system po-
tential purchasers of assets may be credit constrained. In either case, opportunities to col-
lect much by means of liquidation may be limited for institutional reasons. 
Yet, knowledge about how diversity in terms of asset tangibility affects the firm-
internal allocation of funds and thereby the borrowing capacity is still vague. This is 
remarkable, the more so as MNCs nowadays account for a significant share of capital 
expenditure, employment, and value added around the globe. For example, in 2003 the 
value added of majority-owned nonbank foreign affiliates in the U.S. accounted for 5.8 
percent of total value added in U.S. private industries. The value added of nonbank U.S. 
parents accounted for an additional 24 percent. Hence, U.S. GDP can be traced back, for 
a large part, to the operations of multinational corporations.3 
Against this background, this paper provides a rationale for multidivisional decision-
making in an international context by examining the role of diversity in terms of asset tan-
                                                 
2  It is widely recognized that country-specific institutions determine how external financiers assure 
themselves of getting a return on their investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
3  These figuers are calculated from Zeile (2005) and Mataloni (2005). Similar figures can be obtained 
for the EU (discussion in Hanson and Slaughter, 2004).  
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gibility for external financing constraints and for the firm-internal allocation of funds. We 
adopt a contracting approach where headquarters has an incentive to default strategically 
in order to renegotiate the terms of a debt contract. External financiers thus restrict the 
face value of debt to the proceeds of liquidating assets. How they cope with diversity in 
terms of asset tangibility crucially depends on whether they are able to control the alloca-
tion of funds across subsidiaries. When the MNC's investment policy is transparent, a fi-
nancial contract governs the use of funds (as in the case of a tight lending relationship 
with a bank), and headquarters can commit to favoring subsidiaries in countries where as-
sets are highly tangible. When, however, applicable disclosure rules and accounting stan-
dards are not reliable, not even the use of funds by headquarters is verifiable and financi-
ers are thus not able to control the internal allocation of funds. The MNC is then referred 
to as being opaque and headquarters is inclined to improve its relative bargaining position 
for renegotiations by investing funds strategically biased, i.e. in a way which restrains fi-
nanciers to some extent from liquidating assets in case the firm defaults. 
One important question that can be addressed is whether MNCs are in some way bound 
to go to certain countries. The argument in this paper suggests that firms, which have to 
finance their investments to a large extent externally but cannot commit to a specific in-
vestment policy, are generally better off by choosing a relatively low degree of diver-
sity. Transparent firms, however, can pledge their highly tangible assets to obtain exter-
nal finance for investments in countries where institutions are less developed. The rea-
son is that the pooling of projects, which are diverse in terms of tangibility, is only 
worthwhile when the firm does not become too opaque. To put it differently, the benefit 
of integrating projects that differ with respect to the degree of asset tangibility is that 
projects with severely limited liquidation values may obtain external finance, which 
they would not if they were stand-alones. On the other hand, the dark side of integration 
is that diversity may come along with opacity, which creates additional disincentives on 
the part of headquarters. MNCs headquartered in, e.g., emerging markets may thus be 
bound to favor other emerging countries in order to keep diversity within a narrow 
range. 
The arguments in this paper add to the theoretical literature on the allocation mecha-
nisms inside a multidivisional firm.4 A common basic assumption in this literature is 
that headquarters exerts control rights over the resources pooled in a multidivisional 
firm (Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein, 1994), and as long as it is not contrary to existing 
law or enforceable contractual agreements, these rights allow headquarters to pursue its 
own interests while deciding on the allocation of funds. The main motive driving its de-
cision is to channel resources to the most productive projects or, to put it differently, to 
                                                 
4 See  Hellwig, Laux and Müller (2002) and Stein (2003) for comprehensive surveys on this literature.  
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pick up winners (Stein, 1997).5 Albeit this strategy aims at improving the efficiency of 
capital allocation, it also generates additional adverse incentives. On the divisional 
level, incentives to exert effort (Brusco and Panunzi, 2005) or to gather and process in-
formation (Stein, 2002) may be weak. Moreover, internal power struggles among divi-
sion managers may hamper efficient capital allocation (Rajan, Servaes and Zingales, 
2000). Concerning disincentives for headquarters, it may not be willing to provide nec-
essary incentives for division managers by paying them higher wages but by assigning 
higher capital budgets (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). In addition, integrating projects 
may allow headquarters to turn its back on external financiers once the pooling of inter-
nally generated cashflows suffices in order to ensure follow-up finances for at least 
some of its projects, thereby lowering headquarters' incentive to meet its obligations 
vis-a-vis financiers (Inderst and Müller, 2003).6 
Investment-financing relationships for multinational firms have been addressed by some 
empirical research. Stevens and Lipsey (1992), e.g., show for a sample of seven U.S. 
multinationals that capital expenditures in different countries are interrelated by means 
of firm-wide borrowing constraints. Desai and Foley (2004) add to this evidence. Their 
study, which is based on almost comprehensive data on U.S. multinationals' activities 
provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, confirms that rates of returns and in-
vestment rates of the operations of U.S. multinational firms comove, primarily as a re-
sult of firm-wide borrowing constraints. In addition, Desai, Foley and Forbes (2004) 
show that affiliates of U.S. MNCs in emerging markets – as opposed to local firms – are 
able to use cross-border internal capital markets to capitalize on the competitiveness 
benefits of large currency depreciations. However, although perhaps beneficial in some 
times of financial distress, internal capital markets of multinational firms seem far from 
being frictionless. Denis, Denis and Yost (2002), e.g., document that global diversifica-
tion contributes to similarly large inefficiencies as industrial diversification does and 
leads, on average, to valuation discounts. However, Fauver, Houston and Naranjo 
(2004) find that international diversification has no effect on the value of multinationals 
headquartered in Germany, which suggests that the value of international diversification 
may depend on institutions that exist where the company is headquartered. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce a simple 
model of debt renegotiations. Section 3 deals with a transparent MNC, while section 4 
                                                 
5 Channeling  resources  should  be understood broadly. It may concern cashflows (as in Stein, 1997) as 
well as real assets that are already in place (as in Gertner et al., 1994) or – as in this paper – even 
funds raised externally. 
6  In summary, evidence for dysfunctional internal capital markets in the context of multidivisional 
firms is provided by Berger and Ofek (1995), Lamont (1997), Shin and Stulz (1998) and Rajan et al. 
(2000), among others. In addition, Lins and Servaes (1999) and Fauver, Houston and Naranjo 
(2003) seem to support the view that institutions matter regarding (in-)efficiencies in internal capital 
markets of multidivisional firms.  
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focuses on an opaque MNC. The implications of the analysis are subsequently pre-
sented in section 5. The final section consists of some concluding remarks. 
2  The basic structure of the model 
The model is a contracting model with long-term investments where pledgeability of 
cashflows is limited. It is, therefore, related to papers such as those of Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1990), Hart and Moore (1998) and Campello (2005), but particularly to 
Hart and Moore (1994) from whom we adopt the main assumption that an entrepreneur 
can quit at some date before the returns are due and withdraw his human capital from 
the project. This potential behavior puts an upper bound on total indebtness if the entre-
preneur cannot be costlessly replaced by the financiers. For the same reason as in Hart 
and Moore (1994) the optimal contract is a debt contract where the entrepreneur owes a 
repayment, which is constant across states, and where financiers assume control over 
the project's assets when the entrepreneur does not meet his obligations. 
At date  0 T =  the entrepreneur has two investment opportunities (projects) in different 
countries. Let  n I  denote capital investment in country  1, 2 n =  and suppose that each 
project yields a nonverifiable but safe return  ( ) n R I  at date  2 T =  if the entrepreneur 
contributes his specific knowledge at some intermediate date  1 T = . The production 
function  R  applies to both projects, it is twice continuously differentiable with 
(0) 0 R =  and satisfies the Inada conditions. 
If the entrepreneur does not provide his human capital, the physical assets can generate 
returns only by means of liquidation. The proceeds of liquidation depend on the respec-
tive tangibility of assets. From the perspective of multinational investments, the MNC's 
assets will exhibit a low degree of tangibility when they are primarily bound to a sub-
sidiary located in a country where appropriate institutions are lacking and financiers 
have thus to encounter particular difficulties in finding a potent and reliable buyer for 
the assets. Against this background, we assume that liquidation will yield  1 I β  or  2 I μβ , 
respectively. Through this, tangibility of assets in country 1 is reflected by β  while the 
relation of the degrees of tangibility of both countries is captured by  [0,1] μ∈ . We fur-




n I  in country n is implicitly defined by  ()
fb
n RI γ ′ = . When inter-
nal funds W  of the entrepreneur do not suffice to finance these first-best investments, 
i.e. when  12
fb fb I IW +> , the entrepreneur may raise a loan from external financiers to 
fill this gap. The financial contract may be unenforceable, however, as the entrepreneur 
cannot commit himself at  0 T =  to contribute his specific human capital to the project at 
1 T = . Hence, even though at  0 T =  funds are invested and repayments payable to the 
financiers at  2 T =  are agreed upon, the entrepreneur might initiate renegotiations at  
__________________________________________________________________ IWH 
 
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 4/2006  9
1 T =  to beat down repayments by threatening to withdraw his specific skills. Assuming 
that the entrepreneur has all the bargaining power he can offer a new payment equal to 
the liquidation value of assets and the financiers can do nothing better but accept. The 
entrepreneur, therefore, has an incentive to renege on the repayments to financiers when 
the promised repayment H  exceeds the liquidation value of assets. Put differently, ac-
tual repayments P  are bounded above by the total liquidation proceeds  12 I I β μβ + : 
{ } 12 min , . PH I I βμ β =+  (1) 
To complete the model setup, we need to pin down two further restrictions generally 
known as the participation constraints. First, financiers are willing to supply funds only 
if P  satisfies 
{ } 12 max ( ),0 , PI I W γ ≥+ −  (2) 
which means that, if internal funds W  do not suffice to cover the sum of investments 
12 I I +  and the MNC thus raises a loan L of size  12 I IW + − , financiers are willing to 
meet the demands of the MNC only if P  is at least as large as the respective opportu-
nity costs of external funds. Assuming that financiers are competitively organized, con-
dition (2) holds with equality. 
Second, the entrepreneur will accept a contract when the sum of the projects' returns net 
of repayments to financiers cover at least the opportunity costs of internal funds, which 
could also be invested in the alternative investment yielding a marginal return γ : 
{ } 12 1 2 () () m a x ( ) , 0 R IR IP W I I W γ γ +− + − − ≥ . (3) 
However, since there are no other costs than I  for projects to be carried out, participa-
tion constraint (3) will not be binding in equilibrium and we henceforth neglect it in our 
formal analysis.  
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3  Transparency and commitment 
Having set up the general structure of the model, we proceed with an MNC that is al-
ways transparent irrespective of how diverse (in terms of asset tangibility) it is. This is 
the case when the MNC is headquartered in a country with a highly developed banking 
system and maintains a close lending relationship with a bank. The main characteristic 
of such a lending relationship is that a banker not only supplies funds but is also en-
gaged in monitoring activities that allow her to gather insider information about the 
firm. Based on this knowledge she can thus directly exert influence on the internal capi-
tal allocation. The model setup, therefore, corresponds in principle to that in Diamond 
and Rajan (2001) – with the extension that a banker can squeeze more than anyone else 
out of a company's assets because she is someone who actively controls how funds are 
used by the entrepreneur, and in so doing she may increase the total liquidation value of 
assets.7 
The contracting problem can be seen as a situation where the entrepreneur and the 
banker jointly maximize total surplus with respect to the investment profile  12 (, ) I I  tak-
ing (1) and (2) simultaneously into account. Combining these two restrictions yields 
{ } 12 1 2 max ( ),0 , II I I W βμ β γ +≥ + −  (4) 
and the optimization problem thus reads as 
{}
12
12 1 2 ,
12 1 2
max ( ) ( ) ( )
..
max ( ),0 .
II RI RI I I
st






In what follows the upper index C  denotes commitment. Accordingly, 
C
n I  is the invest-
ment in country n of a transparent firm. We conclude 
                                                 
7  In this sense, the difference between a banker and an unprotected external financier regarding the 
achievable liquidation proceeds is endogenous in our approach.  
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The optimum investment is then characterized by: 
•  If 
C
crit WW ≥ , there are first-best investments in both projects, i.e.  12
CC f b I II ==. 
•  If 
C
crit WW <  and  1 μ < , there is underinvestment in both projects with underin-
vestment being more severe in country 2 where tangibility of assets is worse, i.e. 
21
CC f b I II <<. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
Firstly, as projects have hard-to-pledge returns the MNC is subject to a borrowing con-
straint and needs to fill in the resulting financial gap with internal funds. If there are, 
however, plenty of them the borrowing constraint does not restrain the MNC from first-
best investments (part 1 of proposition 1). Secondly, since assets in country 2 are less 
valuable to a banker ( 1 μ < ) her willingness to grant a loan is even more restricted when 
the entrepreneur uses funds for investment in country 2. The results of proposition 1, 
part 2, are thus driven by the entrepreneur's need to trade off not only the marginal re-
turns on investments but also to take into account the different effects these investments 
have on the strength of the borrowing constraint. Therefore, when the financial con-
straint is binding, i.e. when 
C
crit WW < , an entrepreneur is willing to forgo investment re-
turns in country 2 in favor of financial easing.  
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4  Opacity and strategic allocation 
The financial contract derived in the previous section requires that the entrepreneur can 
credibly commit himself to the investment profile  12 (,)
CC I I , i.e. once the contract is con-
cluded the entrepreneur is not able to use funds (including the loan) in any way different 
from what is stated in the contract. Financiers may, however, not be able to control the 
internal allocation of resources when this allocation is not verifiable – a situation, which 
refers to what is meant by opacity. 
When projects differ regarding the degree of asset tangibility, this deficiency generates 
an additional problem at the entrepreneurial level since, in principle, the entrepreneur 
can henceforth allocate funds strategically. By strategic allocation we mean that the in-
vestment strategy aims at a weakening of the bargaining position of financiers in rene-
gotiations. In what follows now, we will consider the entrepreneur's investment decision 
for a given amount of funds available at first. Subsequently we endogenise the loan size 
and ask what the optimum loan contract will look like when the firm is opaque. 
4.1 Investment  decision 
The entrepreneur decides on capital investment when loan L has already been granted. 
He knows that the allocation of funds may affect what he has to pay back to financiers 
because liquidation proceeds depend on capital allocation, and any promised payments 
higher than the liquidation proceeds can, in principal, be renegotiated later on. While re-
negotiation-proof payments  { } 12 min , PH I I βμ β =+  look identical to those in the case 
of a transparent corporation, their implications are fairly different now. The reason for 
this is that the entrepreneur is subject to a time-inconsistency problem as the allocation 
of funds is not verifiable. 
For the time being we also assume that the MNC does not invest in the alternative in-
vestment (which yields γ ); it will become clear that this restriction will not be binding 
in the optimum. Moreover, owing to the budget constraint it suffices to consider invest-
ment in only one country. Let the upper index S  denote strategic investment. The in-
centive constraint of an opaque MNC then reads as 
{ }
1
11 1 1 1 a r g m a x ( ) () m i n , () ,
S
I IR I R L W I H I L W I βμ β ∈ + +−− + +− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  (7) 
which leads to:  
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Lemma 1 An investment  
11 1 ˆˆ ˆ :( ) ( )
SS S I RI RLW I ′′ =+ −  
is called symmetric as the entrepreneur does not care about asset tangibility, i.e. 
1
1 2 ˆ ()
S I LW =+ , whereas an investment  
11 1 :( ) ( ) ( 1)
SS S IR IR L W Iβ μ ′′ =+ − + −  
is called strategically biased as the entrepreneur places more weight on that project 
with assets that are less tangible and a lessen weight on the other, i.e.  1
1 2 ()
S I LW <+ . 
Define H
∗ as the largest promised repayment for which it does not pay to invest strate-
gically biased and to renegotiate. Then H
∗ and the optimum investment  1
S I  simul-










HR IR L W I
RI RL W I
IL W I βμ β
∗ ⎡⎤ =+ + − ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ −+ + − ⎣⎦















⎧ > ⎪ = ⎨
≤ ⎪ ⎩
 (9) 
where  11 11 ˆˆ () ()
SS S S I LW I H I LW I βμ β βμ β
∗ ++ − < < ++ − .  
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
Lemma 1 is a reformulation of the incentive constraint (7). It reflects that the entrepre-
neur is in principle inclined to allocate funds strategically biased unless either the pro-
jects have identical liquidation values ( 1 μ = ) or promised repayments do not exceed 
some critical value H
∗. This critical value depends on the investment profiles in the 
two regimes and lies in the open interval between the respective liquidation proceeds. 
Intuitively, with H  being small it never pays for the entrepreneur to renege on prom-
ised repayments because the liquidation value of assets is higher than what he promised 
to repay, irrespective of the capital allocation. With repayments being independent from 
the investment policy, the entrepreneur always invests symmetrically (i.e. marginal re-
turns are balanced) as this implies maximum total returns. However, when repayment 
obligations are very high, the entrepreneur always prefers to renege on H , and for this 
he improves his relative bargaining position for renegotiations by investing strategically  
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biased. Yet he will not invest solely in low-tangible assets because this would imply a 
forgoing of too much of the total returns. Finally, for intermediate values of promised 
repayments the entrepreneur takes into account that investing strategically biased has 
not only a benefit (as repayments can thereby be beaten down). Its downside is that it 
also implies a deviation from a return maximizing investment policy. Investing symmet-
rically and observing the contract is, therefore, still advantageous as long as the profits 
of doing so are not lower than investing strategically biased and entering into renegotia-
tions afterwards. But there is a critical repayment obligation H
∗, for which profits of 
investing symmetrically and complying with the contract's promises are exactly equal to 
the profits of investing strategically biased and breaking the contract. For any HH
∗ >  
it does not pay to observe the contract and the entrepreneur is better off with a policy 
where investment is higher in that project where assets are less tangible. 
This behavior implies that repayments are a concave (non-monotonic) function of the 
promised repayment (figure 1). As raising the promised repayments does not impair the 
incentives for symmetric investment as long as they remain below H
∗, actual repay-
ments  P  increase one-to-one in H . However, if the entrepreneur promises to repay 
more than H
∗ he certainly will do both, invest strategically biased and renege on the 
promised repayments afterwards. A marginal increase in H  above H
∗ therefore im-
plies that the amount actually paid by the entrepreneur will drop once and for all, and 
will not change anymore if H  increases further. 
Given the entrepreneur's investment behavior we can then conclude: 
 
Proposition 2 For an opaque MNC that has total funds amounting to LW +  available 
the maximum enforceable repayments to financiers P
∗ are given by H
∗ according to 
lemma 1. With H H
∗ ≤  investment will always be symmetric. 
Proof. The proof follows directly from lemma 1. 
 
One important implication of proposition 2 is that even if a repayment HH
∗ ≤  is prom-
ised the investment profile differs from optimum investment under commitment. As al-
ready shown in section 3, symmetric investment is – given the holdup problem and  1 μ <  
– efficient only if the financial constraint is not binding. However, with an entrepreneur 
who has an opportunity to invest strategically biased there will always be symmetric in-
vestment irrespective of whether the borrowing constraint is binding or not. When com-
pared to a transparent MNC, there is thus a tendency to invest more in assets that are less 
tangible (however, compared to the first best allocation there is no such bias but only un-
derinvestment). This is due to the entrepreneur's lack of ability to commit, and from his 
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Figure 1: 









) ˆ ( ˆ
1 1
S S I W L I − + + μβ β
) ( 1 1




4.2  The optimum loan contract 
Having analyzed the entrepreneur's investment policy for an exogenously given amount 
of funds, let us turn to the question of how many funds can be borrowed by the entre-
preneur when the capital allocation is not verifiable. Assume that the entrepreneur is to 
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to financiers at  0 T =  and proposes both a loan size 
S L  
and a repayment 
S H . But, which combination of 
S L  and 
S H  does maximize the entre-
preneurs profits? When answering this question one has to recognize that financiers an-
ticipate what the entrepreneur will do with the funds and that they will only agree upon 
a loan contract when the proposed size of the loan and the offered repayments ensure 
that they are not worse off than investing in the alternative asset. 
From our analysis so far, we are able to specify the incentive-compatible relationship 
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Lemma 2 For  0 W >  the maximum the entrepreneur can commit to paying (P
∗) is a 
continuous and monotonously increasing function of the loan size L satisfying 
















0i f 0 PL
∗ >= . 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
Intuitively, as an increase in the loan size allows the entrepreneur to accumulate more 
assets, and since assets' returns can only be pledged up to their liquidation value, any 
additional dollar lent to the entrepreneur increases the maximum enforceable repayment 
by the projects' marginal liquidation value. This value is at most as large as the marginal 
liquidation value β  of the most tangible assets but higher than that of the least tangible 
assets μβ . Moreover, with  0 W >  the maximum enforceable repayment is strictly posi-
tive since any investment has a positive liquidation value to be pledged even if in-
vestments are financed solely by internal funds. 
Besides, the financiers' participation constraint defines another relationship between P
∗ 
and L that has to be taken into account: 
 
Lemma 3 According to (2) financiers are willing to extend lending by 
1 γ
−  when the en-
forceable repayments P
∗ increase by one dollar. 
Proof. Omitted. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the interplay between these two relationships assuming  1 μ < . The 
dashed line represents the financiers' participation constraint. It depicts the maximum 
size of the loan, which is dependent on what financiers can extract from the entrepre-
neur given that they are marginally willing to accept the contract. Its intercept is zero 
and its slope in the ( , ) LP
∗ -space is γ . The solid line represents the maximum the en-
trepreneur can credibly commit to pay as a function of the loan size. It has a positive in-
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Figure 2: 








) ( 2 1
fb fb I I +
S H
) ( 2 1 W I I
fb fb − +
S L
) ( 2 1 W I I
fb fb − + γ
 
The intersection point of the two relationships represents the combination of the maxi-
mum loan size 
S L  and a promised repayment 
S H  such that the associated maximum en-
forceable repayments make financiers marginally willing to accept the contract. Any 
loan larger than 
S L  is not feasible since this calls for higher repayments to financiers 
than the entrepreneur is able to commit himself to pay. Hence, when external funds re-
quired for first-best investments ( 12
fb fb I IW + − ) exceed the maximum loan size 
S L  (as it 
is in figure 2), the borrowing constraint is binding. Consequently, a financially con-
strained entrepreneur raises a loan 
S L  and offers a repayment 
S H , and he will invest 
symmetrically and will not renege on 
S H  afterwards.8 On the other hand, when 
12
fb fb I IW +−  is smaller than 
S L , the borrowing constraint is not binding and the entre-
preneur raises a loan just to fill his financial gap  12
fb fb I IW + − . We summarize: 
                                                 
8  Note, raising a loan that is smaller than 
S L  is not efficient here. This is because the entrepreneur then 
forgoes net investment returns since marginal returns on investment are higher than γ  due to gen-
eral underinvestment as a result of a binding borrowing constraint.  
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Proposition 3 For  12
fbf b WI I <+ there is a unique optimum loan contract given by a 
pair (, )
SS L H  such that 
{ } 12 min ,
Sf b f b LL I I W
∗ =+ −  (11) 
and  
,
SS HL γ =  (12) 
with L
∗ being the loan size, for which the associated maximum enforceable repayments 
(according to the entrepreneur's incentive constraint (7)) cover exactly its opportunity 
costs (according to the financiers' participation constraint (2)). The implied investments 
are then given by 
1
()   f o r  a l l   1 , 2 .
2
SS
n IL W n =+ =  (13) 
 
Proof. The proof follows from lemmata 1 to 3 and proposition 2. 
 
Before turning to some implications of the model, it should be noted that it is indeed not 
crucial to assume that the MNC will not use loans for the alternative investment. Since 
there is underinvestment, the marginal return on either project is never lower than the 
marginal return on the alternative investment. Hence it is never worthwhile to use 
scarce funds for that purpose.  
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5 Implications 
Diversity and opacity have several implications for the investment behavior of multina-
tional corporations. The most important ones, however, are those related to the strength 
of the borrowing constraint. To fully understand how the incentives for the entrepreneur 
affect international capital allocation, it is useful to distinguish clearly between changes 
in diversity and changes in the overall tangibility of assets. To do so we redefine the 
marginal liquidation value in country 1 as  0 :/ ( 1 ) β βμ = + , such that variations in μ  re-
flect changes in the degree of diversity, while changes in the average liquidation pro-
ceeds are captured by variations in  0 β  – given that the MNC allocates funds across sub-
sidiaries symmetrically. 
The first implication refers to the minimum internal funds, which are required for a 
first-best investment policy: 
 
Implication 1 Internal funds required for first-best investments do not depend on the 
degree of diversity when the MNC is transparent, while they do increase according to 
the degree of diversity when the MNC is opaque. 
 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
A transparent MNC that is able to pursue first-best investments can do so irrespective of 
how diverse it is. The reason for this can be traced back to the financiers' ability to con-
trol the internal allocation of funds as this implies that the only thing that matters here is 
the average liquidation value  0 β , which by definition does not change with diversity. 
However, when the capital allocation is not verifiable, a higher degree of diversity cre-
ates additional incentives for the entrepreneur to invest strategically biased, which im-
plies that the maximum enforceable repayments decrease. To encounter this, financiers 
curtail credit. Consequently the MNC needs more internal funds in order to invest first-
best optimally when diversity becomes more of an issue. 
Implication 1 also means that, for a given degree of diversity, internal funds required for 
first-best investments are higher when opacity forms an additional obstacle for financi-
ers to collect loans: Recall, when the entrepreneur possesses own funds amounting to 
C
crit W  (as defined in proposition 1) he would be able to raise a loan of  12
fbf b C
crit I IW +−  if 
the allocation were verifiable. But with total funds of  12
fbf b I I +  available, an entrepre-
neur whose investment policy is not verifiable will invest symmetrically only if prom-
ised repayments do not exceed an H
∗ that is associated with these funds. Otherwise the 
entrepreneur aims at renegotiations, for which a strategically biased investment policy is 
advantageous. From lemma 1, however, we already know that H
∗ is strictly smaller 
than the liquidation value of a symmetric investment. Hence, since investing first-best  
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optimally is a special case of a symmetric investment policy, a promised repayment of 
01 2 0.5 ( )
fbf b I I β + , which just about suffices to make financiers accept the contract when 
the capital allocation would be contractible, is higher than the associated critical H
∗. 
Accordingly, the entrepreneur has an incentive to invest strategically biased. But when 
investing relatively more funds into that country with a lower asset tangibility, financi-
ers would not be able to extract sufficiently high repayments from the entrepreneur dur-
ing the course of renegotiations. Consequently, they are ex ante not willing to provide 
enough funds required for first-best investments when the entrepreneur contributes own 
funds equal to 
C
crit W . Put differently, an opaque MNC needs more internal funds for first-
best investments. Along the same line of arguments, we can also draw the more general 
conclusion that for a given degree of diversity the borrowing constraint is tighter when 
financiers suffer from opacity. 
Next we will consider how the described disincentives affect the relative capital alloca-
tion when diversity in terms of tangibility becomes more severe. 
 
Implication 2 An increasing degree of diversity implies that 
 
1.  when the MNC is financially constrained and opaque, the share of  2
S I  in total 
investment does not change but total investment falls; 
2.  when the MNC is financially constrained and transparent, investment in the 
country with highly tangible assets  1
C I  as well as total investment increases, 
whereas the response of investment in the other country is indeterminate. 
 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
When the capital allocation cannot be governed by a contract, i.e. opacity is severe, any 
(changes in the) differences in the tangibility of assets are irrelevant regarding the rela-
tive distribution of funds among different projects. This follows from proposition 3, ac-
cording to which the entrepreneur always invests symmetrically irrespective of the de-
gree of diversity. However, the strength of the borrowing constraint and, therefore, total 
investment heavily depends on diversity since a decrease in μ  provides an additional 
incentive for the entrepreneur to invest strategically biased and the financiers' propen-
sity to grant a loan dwindles. 
The results are, however, completely different when opacity does not hamper financial 
contracting. In this case, the banker requires the entrepreneur to shift funds in favor of 
that country where assets are highly tangible. As the entrepreneur can comply with 
those demands due to his ability to commit, the banker is willing to extend lending. Ac-
cordingly, total investment increases when diversity becomes more severe, and as the 
entrepreneur can back investments in low tangible assets to an increasing degree with 
its highly tangible assets, even the project with a lower degree of tangibility may bene- 
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fit. This suggests that, e.g., German multinationals can effectively make use of tangible 
assets at home to pledge them for international investments. 
Another, related aspect refers to the effects of variations in internal funds on the relative 
capital allocation, which also differ depending on whether the entrepreneur is able to 
pursue a commitment policy or not: 
 
Implication 3 Declining internal funds imply that 
 
1.  when the MNC is financially constrained and opaque, the share of  2
S I  in total 
investment does not change; 
2.  when the MNC is financially constrained and transparent, the share of  2
C I  in 
total investment is likely to decrease particularly if 
a.  diversity is high (μ  is low), 
b.  average tangibility ( 0 β ) is high, and 
c.  marginal opportunity costs of funds (γ ) are low. 
 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
According to the first part of implication 3, changes in internal funds have no effects on 
the relative capital allocation when the entrepreneur cannot commit to any investment 
policy. Again, as we already know from proposition 3, contracts will in this case always 
be designed so that the entrepreneur invests symmetrically. Therefore, variations in in-
ternal funds do not affect the relative distribution of funds at all but only total invest-
ment spending. 
The second part has the following intuitive rationale: Note first that a high average tan-
gibility in combination with a high degree of diversity and relatively low marginal op-
portunity costs of funds implies that the banker does not forfeit much when the entre-
preneur enters into renegotiations given that he has invested most of his funds in highly 
tangible assets. On the flip side, potential losses to the banker are severe when funds 
have been invested in the country where asset tangibility causes much concern. Hence, 
an entrepreneur who reduces investment in that country where asset tangibility is worst 
will therefore be honored by the banker who substantially eases the financial constraint. 
As this absorbs most of the initial impact of a tightening of the borrowing constraint the 
entrepreneur's optimum response to declining internal funds is to reduce the share of in-
vestment in less tangible assets in the total investment. Note this strategy is, to some ex-
tent, irrespective of its opportunity costs, which may come from additional differences 
in the marginal returns on investment.  
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Altogether, the model implies that multinationals from emerging countries may be 
bound to go to countries with similarly developed institutions, while those from, say 
Germany, are almost free to go anywhere. If MNCs from emerging economies would 
apply for a loan to invest where assets are significantly more tangible, financiers would 
be rightly anxious about the firm not deviating from what it promised to invest there. 
Headquarters may instead divert money for spending it on investments at home (or in 
other emerging markets). Anticipating this disincentive, financiers are rather unwilling 
to provide funds. Therefore, investments into countries associated with a higher degree 
of tangibility is, for those firms, worthwhile only if there are plenty of internal funds 
available. On the other hand, when the MNC is tied to a banker who makes it fairly im-
possible for headquarters to deviate, it can pledge its highly tangible assets to obtain ex-
ternal funds for investments into countries where institutions are less developed.  
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6  Summary and concluding remarks 
This paper has developed a theory of multinational investments. As multinationality re-
fers to differences in the development of institutions that, e.g. provide for the enforce-
ability of contracts and laws on a country level, it is associated with differences in the 
tangibility of assets across subsidiaries. The flip side of multinationality is that it may 
also be associated with opacity. Firms that are headquartered in countries with weak 
creditor protection can conceal how they allocate funds internally. When, in addition, 
subsidiaries differ with respect to tangibility, headquarters has an incentive to favor sub-
sidiaries in those countries where the degree of tangibility is lowest. On the other hand, 
firms tightly bound to banks are transparent concerning the internal capital allocation. 
These firms are able to commit to investing predominantly in countries where financiers 
will yield higher liquidation proceeds. 
In either case, limited pledgeability may cause a borrowing constraint and with regards 
to the strength of the borrowing constraint, we derive the following implications: 
Firstly, only if the firm is opaque, does the need for internal funds required for first-best 
investments rise when diversity increases. In other words, for a given degree of diver-
sity the borrowing constraint is tighter when financiers suffer from opacity. Secondly, a 
higher degree of diversity may destroy potential benefits of integration when opacity 
prevails. Thirdly, when the entrepreneur's investment policy is transparent and diversity 
is pronounced, a fall in internal funds affects the project with the lowest liquidation 
value the most. When, on the other hand, the firm is opaque, both projects are identi-
cally affected by decreasing internal funds. 
It is necessary to make a few remarks on the causes of potential differences in the tangi-
bility of assets. Diversity in terms of tangibility may not only result from multinational-
ity. Assets in some lines of business may also be more tangible than in other industries, 
even in the same country. Yet, operating in different industries implies that the respec-
tive production functions can also be expected to differ across divisions. The assump-
tion, however, that the same production technology applies to different subsidiaries 
means that diversity in terms of asset tangibility can only be traced to institutional dif-
ferences, which can be predominantly associated with multinationality. Thus, when di-
versity in tangibility arises for reasons other than multinationality, the model may be ap-
plied to ordinary multidivisional firms as well, while at the same time other models of 
internal capital markets cannot be associated with multinationality. 
To conclude, our approach can in principle be applied to a broader set of question, e.g. 
what implications do diversity and opacity of MNCs have for macroeconomic issues 
such as the international transmission of business cycles, growth, and the effects of fi-
nancial crisis. For example, in the 1990s the Japanese MNCs were not able to offset de-
creasing supply of bank loans at home by an increase of financing in the U.S., and they 
had thuse to reduce the number of foreign direct investment projects in the U.S. (Klein,  
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Peek and Rosengren, 2002). This observation is consistent with the argument developed 
in this paper. The Japanese banking crisis was associated with enormous collateral de-
valuations in Japan, hence the degree of diversity increased substantially. As it is rea-
sonable to posit that U.S. investors judge Japanese MNCs as fairly opaque, they had to 
face the additional risk that funds provided to U.S. affiliates would then be shifted to Ja-
pan. Moreover, the willingness to provide external finance dwindled even further as in-
ternal funds generated by Japanese MNCs had also decreased during the course of the 
deep Japanese recession.9 Although suggestive, a deeper analysis of these and related 
questions is arguably worthy of further research. 
 
                                                 
9   A similar reasoning can be given for the decline in lending activities of Japanese banks in the U.S. 
as observed by Peek and Rosengren (2000).  
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 






γβ μ γμ β
γβ γβ
− − ′′ −− =
−−
, (14) 
12 1 2 () 0
CC C C II I I W βμ βγ +− + − ≥ , (15) 
0 λ ≥ , (16) 
() 12 1 2 () 0
CC C C II I I W λβ μ β γ +− + − = , (17) 
with (14) being the marginal condition, (15) the borrowing constraint, and  the La-
grangian multiplier. 
The critical value of internal funds 
C
crit W  is obtained from (15) where it holds with equal-
ity for 
Cf b
n I I = . When the entrepreneur invests first-best optimally in project n, i.e. 
()
fb
n RI γ ′ = , the marginal condition (14) requires for project mn ≠  that  ( )
fb
m RI γ ′ =  
also holds, i.e. first-best investment in project m  is optimal too. When 
C
crit WW < , the 
borrowing constraint is binding and from (14) we have  12 () ()
CC R IR I ′′ <  so that  12
CC I I >  
for all 
C
crit WW < . 
 




11 1 1 1 a r g m a x ( ) () m i n , ()
S
I IR I R L W I H I L W I βμ β ∈ + +−− + +− ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  
and assume that H  is sufficiently large so that the entrepreneur always enters into rene-
gotiation. He then chooses  11
SS I I =  according to the FOC 
11 () ( ) ( 1 )0 .
SS RI RLW I βμ ′′ −+ − − − =  
On the other hand, with H  being very small renegotiations are never worthwhile and 
11 ˆ SS I I =  according to  
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11 ˆˆ () ( )0
SS RI RLW I ′′ −+ − =  
is optimal. Furthermore, because of 
11 1 1 ˆˆ () ( ) () ( ) ,
SS SS R I RL W I H RI RL W I H ++ − − > ++ − −  
which holds for all H  since total returns associated with  1
S I  are strictly lower than 
those associated with  1 ˆS I , it is never worthwhile to invest strategically biased when the 
entrepreneur will certainly observe the contract and pay H . Accordingly, because of 
11 1 1
11 1 1
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) () ()
( ) () () ,
SS S S
SS S S
RI RL W I I L W I
R I R LW I I LW I
βμ β
βμ β
++ − −− + −
< + +− − − +−
 
which holds since  1
S I  already maximizes profits given that renegotiations take place, it 
is never worthwhile to invest symmetrically when the entrepreneur will pay exactly the 
liquidation value of assets. Combining these two results yields that the entrepreneur will 
never invest strategically biased without entering into renegotiations and, at the same 
time, he will never invest symmetrically without observing the contract's rules. 
To conclude, the entrepreneur will invest strategically biased ( 1
S I ) and reneges on H  if 
and only if the profits of doing so are strictly higher than those associated with investing 
symmetrically ( 1 ˆS I ) and observing the contact's rules: 
11 11 1 1 ˆˆ ( ) () ( ) () () .
SS SS S S R I RL W I H RI RL W I I L W I βμ β + +− −< + +− − − +−  
Hence there is a critical HH
∗ =  (given by (8)), for which the entrepreneur is indiffer-
ent and (9) follows immediately. 
Finally, we have  11 ()
SS HI L W I βμ β
∗ >+ + −  because of (8) and because 
11 11 ˆˆ () ( ) () ( )
SS SS R I R LW I R I R LW I ++ − > ++ −  holds for all  11 ˆ SS I I ≠  as  1 ˆS I  already 
maximizes the sum of the projects' returns. Additionally,  11 ˆˆ ()
SS HI L W I βμ β
∗ <+ + −  
holds, which can be proven by contradiction: Suppose the opposite to be true, i.e. 
11 ˆˆ ()
SS HI L W I βμ β




ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ( ) () ()
ˆˆ () ( )




RI RL W I I L W I
RI RL W I H




⎡⎤ ++ − − + + − ⎣⎦
>+ + − −
⎡⎤ = + +− − + +− ⎣⎦
 
However, this is false since  1
S I  already maximizes profits taking into account its effects 
on repayments. 
Proof of Lemma 2  
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Taking into account that maximum enforceable repayments P
∗ are equal to H
∗ and re-





ˆˆ 0( ) ( )
() ( ) ( 1 ) ( )
0( )( ) ( 1 )





PR I R L W I





∗ =− − + −
++ + − − − −+
′′ =− + − − −
′′ =− + −
 
Since the last condition implies  1
1 2 ˆ ()




02 ( ( ) )
2
() ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ,
SS S
PR L W
R I R LW I I LW μβ μ β
∗ =− +
++ + − − − −+
 (18) 
11 0( )( ) ( 1 )
SS RI RLW I β μ ′′ =− + − − − . (19) 
This system of two equations and two endogenous variables P
∗ and  1
S I  defines P
∗ as 
an implicit function of L according to  
1
1












The sign is positive since we know that  11 ˆSS I I >  implying 
1
1 2 (( ) ) ( )
S R LW RLW I ′′ +> + − . But we also know from (18) that 
11 () ( )
SS RLW I RI β μβ ′′ +− = −+ . Hence we can substitute  1 ()
S RI β μβ ′ −+  for 
1 ()
S R LW I ′ +−  in (20) yielding 
1
1























= >  for  0 W >  and any  [0,1] μ∈ . 
Proof of Implication 1  
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μ β + =  the partial derivatives of 
C






To show what happens to the amount of internal funds needed for first-best investments 















which is positive because  1
1 2 ()
S I LW <+ . Hence an increase in diversity lowers the 
maximum enforceable payments P
∗. Consequently, financiers' supply of external funds 
decrease and in order to maintain first-best investments, additional internal funds are 
required to fill the financial gap that arises when diversity increases. More internal 
funds ease the borrowing constraint in two ways. First, maximum enforceable repay-
ments P
∗ increase and the need for external funds for first-best investments decreases. 
 
Proof of Implication 2 
Part 1 of implication 2 is a straightforward implication of proposition 3, whereby it is 
always optimal to invest symmetrically irrespective of how much internal funds are 
available. 
Part 2 of implication 2 results from comparative statics. For investment in country 1 
where asset tangibility is higher we obtain: 
( ) () ( )
02 1
22 1 0 1 (1 ) 1
22
12
() () () ()
0
() ()
CC II CC C C C
CC
RI RI RI RI dI





+ ⎡⎤ ′′ ′ ′ ′ Ω+ Ψ − + − ⎣⎦ =<
′′ ′′ Ψ+ Ω
, 
where 
() 0 :( 1) 0 γμ β Ω= + − > 
and 
() 0 :( 1) 0 γμ μ β Ψ= + − > 
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11 2 0 1 (1 ) 2
22
12
() () () ()
() ()
CC II CC C C C
CC
RI RI RI RI dI





+ ⎡⎤ ′′ ′ ′ ′ ⎡⎤ Ψ+ Ω − − − ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ =
′′ ′′ Ψ+ Ω
. 
But the total investment increases with diversity  
( )
() () ( )















II dI dI R I R I






− ′′ ′′ Ψ+ Ω
+=
′′ ′′ +Ψ + Ω
′′ ′ − −−
+Ω − Ψ




Proof of Implication 3 
Part 1 of implication 3 follows again from proposition 3, viz symmetric investment is 
always optimal. 
Part 2 of implication 3 results from some comparative statics: By applying the general 
implicit function theorem to (15) and (14) for 
C


























WR I R I
γμ β
γγ β
γβ γμ β γβ
′′ ∂ −
=− >






















μ β + =  this condition is more likely to hold true for any 
C
crit WW <  if μ  and γ  
are small and if  0 β  is large because  
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